MODAL EPISTEMOLOGY, REALISM ABOUT MODALITY, AND THE IMAGINATION

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dc.coverageSTUDIA UBB PHILOSOPHIA, LXIII, No. 3, 2018 (p. 67 – 87)en-US
dc.creatorRUSU, Mihai
dc.date2018-12-20
dc.date.accessioned2026-02-21T10:39:33Z
dc.descriptionThe main aim of this paper is to provide a critical discussion of the relation between realist epistemologies of modality and the imagination. Two prominent realist accounts of modal knowledge are examined: a Kripkean one and Williamson’s counterfactual account. I argue that the constraint that Kripke believes should be imposed on the imagination in order to obtain, but also defend metaphysically necessary truths is too strong. This either makes it ineffective, or leads to serious doubts about Kripke’s famous examples of necessary a posteriori truths. The conceptual tension between a modal epistemology that follows Kripke’s suggestion and classicized Kripkean tenets in the philosophy of language is evinced in the analysis of Soames’ version of Kripkeanism. Williamson’s account follows the same line of imposing very strong constraints on the way we form or acquire knowledge of metaphysical necessity, which ultimately leads to similar doubts about its effectiveness. While this critique motivates some sceptical conclusions, it leaves the discussion about the force and extent of modal scepticism open.en-US
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dc.identifierhttps://studia.reviste.ubbcluj.ro/index.php/subbphilosophia/article/view/3155
dc.identifier10.24193/subbphil.2018.3.03
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14637/1084
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherBabeș-Bolyai University / Cluj University Pressen-US
dc.relationhttps://studia.reviste.ubbcluj.ro/index.php/subbphilosophia/article/view/3155/3049
dc.rightsCopyright (c) 2018 Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philosophiaen-US
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0en-US
dc.sourceStudia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philosophia; Volume 63, No. 3, December 2018; 67 – 87en-US
dc.source2065-9407
dc.source10.24193/subbphil.2018.3
dc.subjectmodal epistemology, necessary truth, metaphysical modality, Saul Kripke, Timothy Williamson, counterfactual.en-US
dc.titleMODAL EPISTEMOLOGY, REALISM ABOUT MODALITY, AND THE IMAGINATIONen-US
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.typePeer-reviewed Articleen-US
dc.typetexten-US

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