SELF-REFERENCE AND THE LIMITS OF THOUGHT

dc.coverageSTUDIA UBB PHILOSOPHIA, LXIV, Special Issue, 2019 (p. 111 – 118)en-US
dc.creatorPETRAŞ, Lucian Constantin
dc.date2019-11-30
dc.date.accessioned2026-02-21T10:39:30Z
dc.descriptionSelf-reference and the Limits of Thought. This paper explores the connection between the natural language and a formal language from a particular point of view: self-referential constructions. Such constructions lead to some kind of limits of thought, either in the form of paradoxical constructions (Liar-type or Grelling-type), or in the form of the so called limitative theorems in mathematical logic (e.g. Gödel’s theorem). By deriving Gödel’s significant results from paradoxical constructions the limitative character of such self-referential constructions is preserved, but they open the ways for a new representation of a great variety of arguments in the field of logic, mathematics and philosophy.en-US
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifierhttps://studia.reviste.ubbcluj.ro/index.php/subbphilosophia/article/view/3119
dc.identifier10.24193/subbphil.2019.spiss.08
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14637/1076
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherBabeș-Bolyai University / Cluj University Pressen-US
dc.relationhttps://studia.reviste.ubbcluj.ro/index.php/subbphilosophia/article/view/3119/3012
dc.rightsCopyright (c) 2019 Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philosophiaen-US
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0en-US
dc.sourceStudia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philosophia; Volume 64, Special Issue, November 2019; 111 – 118en-US
dc.source2065-9407
dc.source10.24193/subbphil.2019.spiss
dc.subjectself-reference, paradox, incompleteness theorems, Gödel, Grellingen-US
dc.titleSELF-REFERENCE AND THE LIMITS OF THOUGHTen-US
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.typePeer-reviewed Articleen-US
dc.typetexten-US

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