Counterfactuals, Modal Knowledge, and Understanding

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dc.coverageSTUDIA UBB. PHILOSOPHIA, Vol. 70 (2025), 2, pp. 37-53en-US
dc.creatorRUSU, Mihai
dc.date2025-08-14
dc.date.accessioned2026-02-21T10:40:48Z
dc.descriptionIn this essay, I attempt to diagnose and show the importance of a structural problem that affects Williamson’s counterfactual epistemology of modality. First, I provide a general, even if somewhat heuristical, description of the requirements that a realist epistemology of modality must fulfil. The requirements are analyzed and used for interpreting various controversial choices that Williamson and other philosophers make when theorizing modal knowledge. I then proceed to explain why a more thorough examination of the integration of Williamson’s view of understanding and of his restrictive epistemology of modality leads to the uncovering of a tension that jeopardizes Williamson’s robust realist tenets. I argue that a similar problem (or perhaps different problems with similar underlying reasons) befalls other realist accounts and show why various extant solutions are insufficient. The paper concludes with a reappraisal of the tasks that modal epistemologists have hitherto ignored or treated only collaterally, which may also be interpreted as a critical analysis of the limits of older and newer conceptions of metaphysical modality.en-US
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.identifierhttps://studia.reviste.ubbcluj.ro/index.php/subbphilosophia/article/view/9462
dc.identifier10.24193/subbphil.2025.2.03
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14637/1309
dc.languageeng
dc.publisherBabeș-Bolyai University / Cluj University Pressen-US
dc.relationhttps://studia.reviste.ubbcluj.ro/index.php/subbphilosophia/article/view/9462/9144
dc.rightsCopyright (c) 2025 Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philosophiaen-US
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0en-US
dc.sourceStudia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philosophia; Volume 70, No. 2, August 2025; 37-53en-US
dc.source2065-9407
dc.source10.24193/subbphil.2025.2
dc.subjectmodal epistemologyen-US
dc.subjectrealismen-US
dc.subjectmetaphysical modalityen-US
dc.subjectphilosophy of languageen-US
dc.subjectunderstandingen-US
dc.subjectcounterfactualsen-US
dc.titleCounterfactuals, Modal Knowledge, and Understandingen-US
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.typePeer-reviewed Articleen-US
dc.typetexten-US

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