THE CONSTITUTION OF TIME IN HUSSERL
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Babeș-Bolyai University / Cluj University Press
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The Constitution of Time in Husserl. One of Husserl’s fundamental idea is that time is not an object and is not given to knowledge as a simple object. Being involved in the constitution of the flow of consciousness, time cannot be analysed like other objects of knowledge. Consciousness itself is structured in a temporal way. In the absolute flow of consciousness, this temporality has a synthetic unity with the rest of the intentional features of consciousness. It represents for Husserl a passive synthesis that characterizes the intentional life of the transcendental subjectivity.[1] This specific form of temporality that characterizes the transcendental life of the subject has a constitutive dimension that we will discuss.
[1] Cf. Al. Schnell, Husserl et les fondaments de la phénoménologie constructive, col. Krisis, Ed. Milon, 2005.